Monetary policy in a world with interest on reserves by Charles T. Carlstrom & Timothy S. Fuerst
ECONOMIC COMMENTARY
Monetary Policy in a World with 
Interest on Reserves
Charles T. Carlstrom and Timothy S. Fuerst
Banks have long been required to hold reserves equal to a percentage of their net transactions accounts (checkable 
deposits, for example), but until recently, they earned no interest on those reserves. The Fed now pays interest on 
required and excess reserve balances, having been granted the authority by Congress and putting the policy into 
place ahead of schedule so that it could be used to help address the ﬁ  nancial crisis. The policy will be particularly 
useful when it’s time to start tightening policy and unwind the Fed’s balance sheet.
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The Federal Reserve has long advocated for the author-
ity to pay interest on banks’ excess and required reserve 
balances. For example, in March of 2001, Board Governor 
Lawrence Meyer argued that ﬁ  nancial innovation had 
pushed bank reserves to such low levels that greater funds 
rate volatility might result. To push reserves back up to 
higher levels, Meyer advocated paying interest on reserves 
(hereafter, IOR). Many argued that IOR would make it 
easier to hit the federal funds rate target, and changes in the 
IOR rate could also be an additional policy tool. 
Congress granted the authority to pay IOR in 2006, and 
the new policy was set to begin in 2011. This start date was 
accelerated, however, when Congress authorized the Fed-
eral Reserve Board to put the policy into effect in October 
2008, during the heart of the ﬁ  nancial crisis. According to 
the press release announcing the change, paying IOR was 
intended to help keep the fed funds rate close to its target, 
but it was also expected to “give the Federal Reserve greater 
scope to use its lending programs to address conditions 
in credit markets….” Chairman Bernanke subsequently 
clariﬁ  ed that the policy would also allow the Fed to change 
the funds rate independent of changes in its balance sheet. 
(testimony to Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House 
of Representatives, February 10, 2010).
In this Commentary, we review the effects of the new IOR 
policy. We argue that it clearly allows for easier unwinding 
of the unprecedented expansion the Fed’s balance sheet. We 
also argue that it will be useful as a policy tool going for-
ward because the vast quantity of excess reserves that exists 
now has impaired the liquidity of the funds market. 
Bank Reserves and the Federal Funds Market
Banks are required to hold reserves (vault cash and deposits at 
the Fed) equal to a fraction of their net transactions accounts, 
which are largely demand deposits. On any given day, some 
banks will ﬁ  nd themselves with more reserves than they are 
required to hold, while other banks might ﬁ  nd themselves in 
the opposite situation. Banks with excess reserves (ER) will 
lend these out in the federal funds market. The rate charged 
on these short-term loans is called the federal funds rate. 
Historically, banks held very few excess reserves (less than $1 
billion) because the Fed did not pay interest on these reserves, 
and banks could earn more by lending them out. But when 
the federal funds rate effectively hit zero in December 2008, 
the opportunity cost of holding ER was eliminated (that is, 
banks lost nothing by holding onto ER because they could 
earn nothing by lending them out). This, along with the 
increased demand for liquidity, led banks to start accumulating 
excess reserves, which rose to over $800 billion by the end of 
2008. The expanded supply of reserves was a result of the Fed 
extending large amounts of credit through various facilities, 
which were not offset by equivalent sales of Treasury securities 
The demand for bank reserves comes from the requirement 
to hold reserves along with banks’ desire to have some ER 
on hand to cover withdrawals. Given banks’ demand, the 
Fed can achieve any desired target for the federal funds rate 
by altering the supply of reserves. But since the Fed cannot 
perfectly anticipate all ﬂ  uctuations in banks’ demand for 
reserves, the actual federal funds rate may ﬂ  uctuate around 
the announced target rate set by the FOMC. (See ﬁ  gure 1.) 
During normal times, these funds rate “misses” are typically 
small and short-lived (usually one to two days) because the 
Fed can adjust the supply of reserves to move the rate back 
to the target. 
But during the ﬁ  nancial turmoil throughout 2008 these 
misses became larger. There was a huge ﬂ  ight to liquidity 
during the period, which manifested itself in an increased 
desire to hold extremely liquid Treasury bills and ER. The 
surge of excess reserves available in the market was difﬁ  cult 
to forecast, implying that it became more difﬁ  cult to hit the 
funds rate target.
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about holding large quantities of excess reserves. With no bet-
ter interest-earning alternative for these funds, banks will hold 
an unlimited amount. Their demand curve becomes perfectly 
ﬂ  at. In this special case, even unexpected increases in reserve 
demand (as happened during the fall of 2008) would not 
force the actual funds rate up above the target because banks 
could easily accommodate this demand out of their excess 
reserves. Under such a scenario, one would also anticipate 
fewer misses of the funds rate target.
In the more likely scenario, the funds rate will be some-
what above the IOR rate, as shown in ﬁ  gure 2. In this case, 
increases in reserve demand (labeled “high reserve demand” 
in ﬁ  gure 2) will result in modest deviations between the 
actual and target federal funds rates. Note that the same out-
come will not occur if the funds rate target is signiﬁ  cantly 
above the IOR rate.
Thus, one clear advantage of IOR is to improve the ability 
of the Fed to hit its funds rate target on a day-to-day basis. A 
decline in funds rate volatility is beneﬁ  cial, as it lowers the 
uncertainty for market participants. But there is a “catch 22.” 
With IOR set at or near the funds rate, banks will hold large 
amounts of ER. As a result, they will have less need to borrow 
and lend in the federal funds market to meet day-to-day needs, 
so that the fed funds market could become less liquid. This illi-
quidity makes managing a funds rate target more problematic.
Because of this potential illiquidity, the Chairman has testi-
ﬁ  ed that the “federal funds rate could for a time become a 
less reliable indicator than usual of conditions in short-term 
money markets. … In particular, it is possible that the Fed-
eral Reserve could for a time use the interest rate paid on 
reserves, in combination with targets for reserve quantities, 
as a guide to its policy stance.” That is, even if the Fed does 
not target the fed funds rate, the IOR rate will still act as a 
ﬂ  oor on the funds rate, and increasing the IOR rate will also 
increase the funds rate and thus tighten monetary policy.
Figure 1. Effective and Target Federal Funds Rate Figure 2. The Market for Bank Reserves
Note: Shaded area represents a target range of the funds rate from 0 
percent to 0.25 percent.






























Interest on Reserves Helps Fed Hit Target
This episode highlights the fact that there are periods in 
which the Fed might ﬁ  nd it useful to have some assistance in 
hitting its interest rate target. Figure 2 demonstrates how the 
IOR policy can provide such assistance. 
Banks’ demand for reserves is downward-sloping because 
at lower interest rates there is a smaller opportunity cost to 
holding reserves. That is, as the foregone interest income 
from holding ER declines, banks will demand more re-
serves. This decline is interrupted at the IOR rate because 
banks would never lend reserves at a rate below the IOR 
rate. The absence of a lender at below-IOR rates implies 
that the IOR regime would create an effective ﬂ  oor in the 
funds rate, preventing the funds rate from falling below 
the IOR rate. For symmetric reasons, the primary credit 
rate (the rate at which the Fed will lend to banks) implies 
an effective ceiling on the funds rate, so that together the 
IOR rate and the primary credit rate create a corridor in 
which the funds rate would trade. The corridor minimizes 
the chances for deviations (misses) between the actual and 
target fed funds rates.
Curiously, even after the IOR regime began, the funds rate 
has been slightly below the interest rate offered on excess 
reserves. This anomalous behavior is apparently a result of 
the fact that nonbanks (such as government-sponsored enter-
prises) hold deposits at the Fed but do not earn interest on the 
reserve balances they hold. These nonbank institutions are 
lending in the fed funds market at rates below the interest rate 
on excess reserves. Banks could presumably borrow at the 
funds rate, hold the reserves, and make a proﬁ  t. Why banks 
do not engage in such behavior is unclear. Potential explana-
tions include concerns about bank capital ratios and concerns 
that borrowing large amounts in the overnight funds market 
could be seen as a sign of liquidity problems.
In ﬁ  gure 2, note that as the funds rate falls toward the IOR 
rate, reserve demand ﬂ  attens. This ﬂ  attening occurs because 
as the fed funds target—and presumably, other money market 
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As the economy recovers and the funds rate moves above 
zero, one area of concern is that the Fed’s large balance 
sheet may lead to increases in the money supply and thus 
stoke inﬂ  ation. IOR, along with term deposits and reverse 
repos, is a means of avoiding this problem. Without these 
tools, if the Fed increased the funds rate from 0 percent to 
1 percent, banks would quickly lend out their non-interest-
earning ER in the federal funds market. All of these ER 
ﬂ  owing into the market would put downward pressure on 
the funds rate, making it very difﬁ  cult for the Fed to achieve 
its target. Without these tools, to achieve the target (and 
avoid a substantial increase in the money supply) the Fed 
would have to start selling securities to soak up the ER be-
ing shed by banks. There is potentially a lot to soak up. ER 
are currently on the order of $1,100 billion. Given this large 
size and the fact that much of the balance sheet is in mort-
gage-backed securities (MBS) and long-term government 
securities, this could be quite disruptive to ﬁ  nancial markets. 
IOR is one tool the Fed can use to alleviate this problem. 
Paying IOR can potentially eliminate the desire of banks 
to rapidly shed ER when the funds rate is moved above 
zero (assuming that the IOR rate moves in tandem with 
the funds rate target). Similarly, in his February 10, 2010, 
testimony before the House Committee on Financial 
Services, Chairman Bernanke explained how reverse repos 
and interest-bearing term deposits are also important tools 
to help manage reserve levels while the balance sheet is still 
large. Another option is for the Federal Reserve to sell assets 
from the portfolio, which the FOMC discussed at its April 
27–28, 2010, meeting. No decision was made at this meet-
ing, but the minutes noted that most participants “preferred 
that the agency debt and MBS held in the portfolio be sold 
at a gradual pace that would complete the sales about ﬁ  ve 
years after they began.” This suggests an important role for 
IOR for at least the next few years. 
In the long run, how will monetary policy be different in an 
IOR world? By expanding the level of ER, does IOR create 
an additional policy tool? To answer these questions it is 
ﬁ  rst helpful to recall how policy was implemented before 
IOR. Keep in mind that to affect real output and prices the 
Fed must change the supply of money available to the pub-
lic (that is, the sum of currency in circulation and checkable 
deposits). 
In the past, if the Fed wanted to inject reserves into the 
banking system, it undertook an open market purchase of 
T-bills from banks. This expansion of the supply of reserves 
would push down the funds rate. Further, with no IOR, 
banks would typically lend these new reserves out to earn 
interest. The funds lent out would eventually be redeposited 
in the banking system, and this increased lending would 
increase the money supply, as these loans are lent out again. 
But under a regime where the IOR rate is set equal to the 
funds rate target, a Fed purchase of T-bills has no effect on 
the amount of money in circulation. If banks earn the same 
interest rate on ER and T-bills, they have no incentive to 
lend out the ER that they receive from selling their Treasury 
bills to the Fed. Instead, banks are likely to simply take these 
funds and hold them as ER. Hence, this increased supply of 
reserves will have no effect on the funds rate. These reserves 
will also never make it into circulation nor have an impact 
on prices or economic activity, suggesting that these reserves 
have no power as an additional policy tool. 
While open market operations alone would have no effect, 
changes in the funds rate should have the same effect on the 
money supply and impact on real economic activity as they 
always did. The only difference is in the potential behavior 
of the Fed. With no IOR, the Fed must buy T-bills in order 
to lower the funds rate. In contrast, when the Fed pays IOR, 
a change in the funds rate target would be accompanied by 
a change in the IOR rate. To implement the new target, the 
Fed’s open market desk need not (but still could) purchase 
T-bills in order to support its funds rate target. If they 
purchased T-bills, everything works as above and banks will 
continue to hold the same amount of ER as before. But if 
the desk decided not to purchase T-bills, banks can purchase 
these same T-bills using their ER instead. The shedding of 
reserves by banks boosts the money supply in the same way 
that an open market operation would. 
As shown in ﬁ  gure 2, when the spread between the funds 
rate and the IOR rate is zero, the Fed can expand the level 
of reserves without changing either the funds rate or the 
IOR rate. Indeed this is the reason that IOR can help in 
unwinding the balance sheet. But the ability to control both 
the funds rate and a particular level of reserves is the reason 
that some economists including Marvin Goodfriend have ar-
gued that IOR could give the Fed a new policy tool, supple-
menting its federal funds and discount rate tools. 
This is in effect what the Fed started doing in March 2009, 
when it embarked on a program of credit easing by pur-
chasing longer-term securities. These longer-term securi-
ties included agency MBS, agency debt, and longer-term 
government securities. The reason for buying these assets 
at that time was that the funds rate was already zero and 
could not be lowered further. The hope was that by buying 
longer-term government securities (which still had a positive 
rate of interest), the Fed could drive up the price of long-
term securities and hence decrease their yield, or interest 
rate, ﬂ  attening the yield curve. 
IOR thus allows the level of reserves to be set indepen-
dently of the targeted funds rate. But does the level of 
reserves matter? Reserves are created by the Fed’s purchase 
of ﬁ  nancial assets. Historically, these purchases have largely 
been shorter-term Treasury securities (often with repurchase 
agreements). Reserves created through these purchases of 
short-term Treasuries would not represent a separate policy 
tool because of their close substitutability with ER. 
However, other purchases, such as the recent Fed purchase of 
MBS, are a different matter in that these are not close substi-
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tutes for ER. In an earlier Economic Commentary (October 2009), 
Carlstrom and Pescatori argued that the effect of purchasing 
long-term Treasury securities is likely to be modest and poten-
tially short-lived, although the purchase of MBS may be more 
effective. But these MBS purchases have been extraordinary 
measures. Additional purchases have been discontinued and 
are not likely to take place in normal times.
The Beneﬁ  ts of IOR
During normal times, the macroeconomic beneﬁ  ts of paying 
IOR are limited to a technical improvement for implement-
ing monetary policy. However, the advantages are likely 
to be small, because it is neither a lot easier nor harder to 
achieve our macroeconomic policies if we pay or do not pay 
IOR. On the other hand, it would be a mistake to say that 
the beneﬁ  ts of paying IOR are small. We all own ﬁ  re extin-
guishers despite the fact that on a daily basis we do not use 
them. Similarly, the principal advantage of paying IOR is 
having the tool available to respond to future crises. Further, 
paying IOR is clearly advantageous in the current environ-
ment. In particular, it will make it much easier for the Fed to 
unwind the expansion of its balance sheet. It may also be the 
current policy tool of choice, given decreased trading in the 
funds market owing to elevated quantities of ER. 
There are other advantages to paying IOR. First, there are 
small tax advantages to paying interest on required reserves. 
With no IOR, one reason lending rates are greater than 
deposit rates is because a fraction of deposits cannot be 
loaned out but must be held as non-interest-bearing required 
reserves. This is an implicit tax on intermediation. The elimi-
nation of the reserve requirement tax will tend to drive the 
deposit rate and loan rate closer together and increase inter-
mediation. This effect is likely quite modest as only a small 
fraction of bank deposits are reservable. Second, paying 
IOR will allow banks to lower costs. When the Fed did not 
pay IOR, banks spent resources to regularly “sweep away” 
ER into some interest-earning investment. These ER were 
ultimately held by someone, so all of this bank behavior was 
socially wasteful. But with IOR, these activities will no lon-
ger be necessary, and banks can economize on these costs. 
Third, IOR will lower the day-to-day volatility of the funds 
rate target, making it easier for banks and other market 
participants to manage their portfolios. This could lead to a 
more efﬁ  cient system of monetary policy implementation.
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